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Abstract 
A specialized genetic algorithm applied to the solution of the electric grid interdiction problem is presented in this paper. This problem 
consists in the interaction of a disruptive agent who aims at maximizing damage of the power system (measured as load shed), and the 
system operator, who implements corrective actions to minimize system load shed. This problem, also known as “the terrorist threat 
problem”, is formulated in a bi-level programming structure and solved by means of a genetic algorithm. The solution identifies the most 
vulnerable links of the network in terms of a terrorist attack, providing signals for future reinforcement of the network or more strict 
surveillance of critical elements. The proposed approach has been tested on three case studies: a didactic five-bus power system, a prototype 
of the Colombian power system and the IEEE Reliability Test System. Results show the robustness and applicability of the proposed 
approach. 
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Valoración de la vulnerabilidad de sistemas de potencia ante ataques 
intencionales usando un algoritmo genético especializado  
 
Resumen 
En este artículo se presenta un algoritmo genético especializado aplicado a la solución del problema de interdicción. Este problema consiste 
en la interacción de un agente disruptivo que pretende maximizar el daño al sistema de potencia (medido en deslastre de carga), y el 
operador del sistema que implementa acciones correctivas para minimizar el deslastre de carga. Este problema, también conocido como 
“el problema del terrorista,” es formulado en una estructura de programación binivel y solucionado mediante un algoritmo genético. La 
solución identifica los corredores más vulnerables de la red en términos de un ataque terrorista, suministrando señales  para futuros refuerzos 
de la red o vigilancia más estricta de activos críticos. El enfoque propuesto ha sido probado en tres casos de estudio: un sistema didáctico 
de 5 barras, un prototipo del sistema colombiano y el sistema de pruebas de confiabilidad  IEEE. Los resultados muestran la robustez y 
aplicabilidad de la metodología propuesta.  
 




1.  Introduction 
 
The constant growth of power demand, along with 
stronger environmental regulation, that in most cases delay 
the building of new transmission lines, have forced most 
power systems in industrialized countries to operate near 
their static and dynamic limits. Under this scenario, electric 
power systems are more vulnerable to intentional attacks [1]. 
Some of the most important effects of such attacks include 
load shedding and higher operational costs associated to 
repairing towers and transmission lines [2].  
The traditional approach for power system vulnerability 
is based on the study of credible contingencies (N-1 and N-
2 criteria) [3]-[4]. However, such studies require exhaustive 
simulation and therefore, they are associated with a high 
computational burden; on the other hand, only natural-
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occurring outages are taken into account. Currently, it is well 
known that electric power systems are exposed not only to 
natural random phenomena, but also to malicious attacks. 
That is the case of the Colombian interconnected power 
system which has undergone the effects of terrorist attacks 
for several decades. As a matter of fact, only between 1999 
and 2010 the National Interconnected System (NIS) faced as 
many as 200 terrorist attacks per year [2].   
  The electric grid interdiction problem, also known as the 
“terrorist threat problem” has been the focus of several studies 
in the last decade. This problem was first formulated in [5] as a 
max-min attacker-defender model. In such models the terrorist 
maximizes load shedding, while the system operator minimizes 
it. In [6] and [7] this problem is solved by using linearization 
and applying duality properties. First, the nonlinear expressions 
were recast as linear constraints; then, the inner optimization 
problem was replaced by its dual, turning the max-min bi-level 
optimization problem into a max-max bi-level optimization 
problem. Such a model is equivalent to a single-level 
maximization problem solvable via branch and cut methods. In 
[8] Arroyo and Galiana generalized the terrorist threat problem 
proposed by Salmeron, Wood and Baldick in [5]. The modeling 
approach of the problem proposed in [8] allows defining 
different objective functions for the terrorist and system 
operator. Also, it permits the imposition of new constraints in 
the outer optimization problem that might depend on both, inner 
and outer variables. As regards the terrorist’s interests, different 
objectives can be considered. For example: i) to minimize the 
number of system components to be attacked, in order to 
achieve a given load shed, or ii) to maximize the load shed for a 
given number of system components that can be attacked.  
In [9] the authors present a Mixed Integer Linear 
Programming approach for the analysis of the electric grid 
interdiction problem. In this case the bi-level programming 
problem is first turned into a one-level mixed-integer 
nonlinear programming program by using the fundamental 
duality theorem of linear programming [10]; then, 
disjunctive constraints are used to eliminate the 
nonlinearities of the problem. The resulting problem can be 
solved by using commercially available software. In [11] a 
worst-case interdiction analysis of the terrorist threat 
problem is performed by a generalization of Benders 
decomposition. In [12] the electric grid interdiction problem 
is formulated including line switching, which means that, 
after a terrorist attack, the system operator has also the option 
of switching some lines in order to reduce load shedding.    
In this paper the authors propose a novel Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) approach to address the electric grid 
interdiction problem. Instead of turning the model into a one-
level mixed-integer linear programming problem, the 
problem is solved in its original form as a mixed-integer non-
linear programming problem. Results of the proposed 
algorithm are validated with studies reported in the 
specialized literature, showing its capability to attain 
globally optimal or near-optimal solutions. 
 
2.  Mathematical Formulation 
 
The mathematical formulation of the electric grid 
interdiction problem is provided in equations (1) to (9) [8]. 
In this case the objective of the disruptive agent consists on 
maximizing the total load shedding that can be attained given 
a fixed number of elements (lines or transformers) under 
attack. 
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Where: 
VI: Interdiction vector 
∆ : Load shed in node n 
: Power Flow in line l 
: Incidence Matrix in node n of line l 
: Phase angles in node n 
: Power generation by generator j 
: Power demand in node n 
M: Number of elements under attack 
: Impedance of line l 
: Minimum power generation by generator j 
 : Maximum power generation by generator j 
: Minimum phase angle in node n 
: Maximum phase angle in node n 
The interdiction vector consists of a binary array in which 
every position indicates the state of the element. If the 
position is equal to one it indicates an element on service; 
conversely, if the position is zero it indicates an element out 
of service (under attack). Equations (1) to (3) represent the 
upper level optimization problem (disruptive agent 
problem). For a given number of system components that 
could be attacked (M), the disruptive agent must maximize 
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the load shedding of the system. Such a problem is at the 
same time restricted by the reaction of the system operator 
(equations (4) to (9)). For a given interdiction vector, the 
system operator must perform a re-dispatch of generation in 
order to minimize load shedding.   Note that equations (4) to 
(9) correspond to an optimal DC power flow; furthermore, 
for a given interdiction vector, the inner optimization 
problem is a linear programming problem. 
 
3.  Specialized Genetic Algorithm 
 
The strategy proposed in this paper to approach the 
electric grid interdiction problem consists of using a Genetic 
Algorithm (GA); however, any other metaheursistic 
technique could be applied. The methodology proposed in 
this paper takes advantage of the fact that, for a given 
interdiction vector, the equivalent problem is a DC optimal 
power flow. In this case, a number of interdiction vectors are 
randomly generated as initial candidate solutions and are 
modified in each generation according to the GA’s rules. The 
objective of the GA is to find the maximum load shedding if 
a fixed number of elements are under attack. The flowchart 
of the proposed algorithm is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the proposed GA. 
Source: Own drawing 
 
3.1.  Problem codification 
 
As stated above, every solution candidate of the GA consists 
of a binary chain representing the interdiction vector. Fig. 2 
illustrates an interdiction vector for a power system of 10 
elements over which the elements 3, 5 and 8 are under attack. 
 
Figure 2. GA Codification. 
Source: Own drawing	
 
3.2.  Initial Population 
 
The initial population is randomly generated and consists 
of a set of different interdiction vectors (every interdiction 
vector must have the same number of elements under attack). 
For each interdiction vector a DC optimal power flow is run 
in order to determine the load shedding (which is the fitness 
function of the GA). With such information the individuals 
are ready to proceed for the next GA steps. 
 
3.2.  GA’s Operators 
 
     The selection operator of the GA is performed by 
choosing the best solutions after applying a series of 
tournaments with a given number of elements. In this case, the 
number of candidates selected for the next step (recombination) 
is the same number of parents. The recombination is performed 
at a single point randomly selected. Every individual generates 
two new ones; in this stage two times the initial population is 
created. The mutation makes a minimal change in some of the 
individuals. The mutation is performed using a mutation factor 
(with a low probability) with every bit of the interdiction vector. 
If mutation or recombination leads to non feasible candidates, 
such candidates are penalized in the objective function. Finally, 
to keep the number of candidate solutions constant, only the best 
solutions are kept in each iteration. 
 
4.  Test and Results 
 






4.1.  Case A. Five bus Power System 
 
The	 first	 test	 is	 performed	 with	 the	 5	 bus	 power	
system	 illustrated	 in	Fig.	 3.	This	 system	has	been	used	
only	for	comparison	purposes,	and	to	illustrate	that	the	




Figure 3. Five bus power system 
Source: Adapted from Arroyo J. and Galiana 2005, [8].	
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Table 1. 







1 50 150 
2 170 150 
3 90 150 
4 30 150 
5 300 150 









 1-2 0.336 
 1-3 0.126 
 1-4 0.180 
 2-3 0.215 
 3-5 0.215 
 4-5 0.130 









Worst combination of 
destroyed lines 
1 50  3-5 
4-5  
2 150 3-5, 4-5 
3 150 
1-2, 3-5, 4-5 
1-3, 3-5, 4-5 
1-4, 3-5, 4-5 
2-3, 3-5, 4-5 
4 170 1-2, 2-3, 3-5, 4-5 
Source: Own calculation 
 
It can be observed that for a single line under attack, the 
maximum load shedding obtained is 50 MW. In this case the 
line under attack must be either line 3-5 or line 4-5. Any 
other single attacked line would not result in load shedding. 
On the other hand, for two lines under attack there is only 
one strategy to obtain maximum load shedding (attacking 
lines 3-5 and 4-5 simultaneously). For a maximum of three 
lines under attack there are three possible interdiction vectors 
that would render a maximum load shedding of 150 MW. 
Finally, if only 4 lines could be taken down simultaneously, 
the maximum load shedding would be 170 MW. 
 
4.2.  Case B. Prototype of the Colombian Power System 
 
To show the applicability of the proposed approach in 
real power systems, a prototype of the Colombian power 
system was considered. Due to security reasons, a real  
Figure. 4. Prototype of the Colombian power system. 
Source: Adapted from Lopez-Lezama et al. 2006 [13]. 
 
 
Colombian system with actual data cannot be displayed. 
Fig. 4 illustrates the system under study. This system has 20 
nodes and 40 lines and is distributed in 5 sub-areas. The total 
demand of the system is 9010 MW and the installed capacity 
is 12850 MW. Specific line, load and generation data for this 
system can be consulted in [13]. Three different scneraios 
were considered: 
 Scennario A: Considering all generation units 
available. 
 Scenario B: Limiting generation in sub-area 5. The 
generation availabe in node 18 was reduced to 42% 
(1500MW). 
 Scenario C: Limiting generation in sub-area 3. The 
generation available in node 13 was reduced to 25% 
(500 MW). 
Several tests were performed in each scenario, for 
different numbers of circuits under attack, to find the 
worst combination of destroyed lines. The GA was 
developed in Matlab and was run in a computer with 
CORE I3 processor and 2Gb of RAM memory. The 
mutation rate was set to 5% and 100 parents were used in 
the initial population. The best results were found in only 
ten generations and around 300 seconds.  Results are 
shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  
Results show that Scenario C with 6 destroyed lines 
is the worst possible case in terms of load shedding. It 
causes 2637.58 MW of load shed, 29.27% of the total 
system demand. This attack would cause a bottling up of 
energy in bus 18 and load shedding in buses 4, 5, 8, 9, 
10, 14, 19 and 20. Fig. 6 illustrates the lines and buses 
affected.  
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Table 4. 
Critical combination of destroyed lines for scenario A 
Number of Destroyed 
lines 
Load Shedding  
(MW) 














Critical combination of destroyed lines for scenario B 
Number of 
Destroyed lines 
Load Shedding  
(MW) 
Worst combination of 
destroyed lines 
1		 291.70 9 -11 
2		 772.35 16-19,20-23 
3		 1200.18 7-8,9-11,9-11 
4		 1892.40 7-8,9-11, 15-16, 17-14 




Source: Own calculation 
 
Table 6. 
Critical combination of destroyed lines for scenario C 





Worst combination of destroyed 
lines 
1		 264.90 20-18 
2		 718.17 15-16,17-14 
3		 1218.17 9-11,15-16,17-14 
4		 1718.17 7-8,9-11, 15-16, 17-14 




Source: Own calculation 
 
 
Figure 5. Load shedding for different scenarios and elements under attack  
Source: Own drawing 
Figure 6. Worst case combination of destroyed lines 
Source: Own drawing 
 
The tests also revealed that sub-area 4 is the most 
sensitive to load shedding, especially buses 14 and 15. This 
is due to the fact that in this area the load is higher than the 
installed generation. Furthermore, such generation is mainly 
thermal which is the most expensive. 
 
4.2.  Case C. IEEE Reliability Test System 
 
Several tests were also performed with the 24 bus IEEE 
Reliability Test System [14]. This test system is composed 
of 24 buses, 38 lines, 32 generators and 17 loads. The load 
profile selected for this study corresponds to a winter 
weekday at 6:00 pm (2850 MW).  
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, 
lines in the same corridor are treated independently; which 
means that the failure of a line does not necessarily imply the 
unavailability of the remaining lines in the same corridor. 
Several tests were performed with the GA, considering an 
increasing number of destroyed lines. Table 7 shows the 
worst combination of destroyed lines and the corresponding 
load shedding for this system. It can be observed that the 
simultaneous attack of 6 lines results in the loss of 1017 MW 
that represents 35.7% of the total demand. However, 
attacking a single line does not result in any loss of load. 
In the IEEE Reliability Test System most of the generation is 
located in the upper part of the network, while most of the load 
is distributed in the nodes of the lower part of the system.  As a 
consequence, the simultaneous attack of 5 or 6 lines focusses on 
dividing the system in two islands, separating generation from 
load. Fig. 7 depicts the simultaneous attack of 6 lines (marked 
with blackened circles). As a consequence of this attack the 
system is split into two islands i) the upper area with excess of 
generation capacity and no load shedding and ii) the lower area 
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Table 7. 
Critical combination of destroyed lines for the IEEE Reliability Test System  





Worst combination of destroyed 
lines 
2		 194 11-14, 14-16 
3		 309 16-19,20-23,20-23 
4		 442 3-24,9-12,11-13,14-16 
5		 842 11-13,12-13, 12-23, 14-16,15-24 
6		 1017 7-8,11-13,12-23,12-13,14-16,15-24 




Figure 7. IEEE Reliability test system with 6 lines under attack. 
Source: Own drawing 
 
Table 8 shows the results obtained considering high, 
medium and low load scenarios. For the high load scenario 
the previously defined demand of 2850 MW was considered; 
for the medium load scenario a winter weekday at 9:00 pm 
with a total load of 2365 MW was considered; and finally for 
the low load scenario a summer weekday at 5:00 am with a 
total demand of 1653 MW was taken into account. 
 
Table 8. 
Critical combination of destroyed lines considering different load scenarios 
Number of 
destroyed lines 
Load Shedding (MW) Worst combination of 
destroyed lines High Medium Low 
2 194 161 114 11-14, 14-16 
3 309 256 182 16-19,20-23,20-23 
5 




1017 783 449 
7-8,11-13,12-23,12-
13,14-16,15-24 
Source: Own calculation 
Table 9. 
Critical combination of destroyed lines considering four destroyed lines 
Load Scenario Load Shedding  
(MW) 
Worst combination of 
destroyed lines
High 194 2-6,6-10,11-14,16-14 
Medium 256 15-24,16-19,20-23,20-23 
Low 531 3-24,12-23,13-23,14-16 
Source: Own calculation 
 
 
As is expected, the load shedding is significantly less in 
the low load scenario when compared with the medium and 
high load scenarios. It was also found that the worst 
combination of destroyed lines is the same for 2, 3, 5 and 6 
destroyed lines; however, with 4 lines under attack there is a 
different solution for each of the load scenarios. The worst 
combination of destroyed lines, considering 4 circuits is 
presented in Table 9. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
A specialized genetic algorithm for vulnerability 
assessment of power systems to intentional attacks was 
presented in this paper. The proposed approach is robust and 
efficient and can be applied to real power systems. The tests 
carried out with a prototype of the Colombian power system 
and the IEEE reliability test system allows the most 
vulnerable lines in terms of terrorist attacks to be identified.  
The main advantage of using a GA for solving the electric 
grid interdiction problem is the possibility of having a set of 
high quality solutions instead of a single one solution. This 
gives the system operator more information about its most 
vulnerable elements and provides signals for future 
reinforcements of the network or more strict surveillance on 
critical elements. 
With the use of a GA instead of classical mathematical 
programming, there is no need to bring into play duality 
theory or linearization schemes to transform the electric grid 
interdiction problem into a single-level optimization 
problem. This opens the possibility to approach the 
interdiction problem with a more accurate modeling of the 
network, such as an AC optimal power flow. This will be the 
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